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COMIUNITY PROPERTY AGREEMENTS-
MANY QUESTIONS, FEW ANSWERS
ROBERT F. BRACHTENBACH*
The statute which creates the husband-wife contract commonly
referred to as the community property agreement was first enacted
by the Territorial Legislature of 1879.' Today's statute is RCW
26.16.120.2
A 1950 Law Review Comment' made a comprehensive analysis of
many of the issues raised by the community property agreement.
Reference is made to the Comment for background material. This
article has a dual purpose: first, to inquire further into some of the
issues discussed in the 1950 Comment with particular and detailed
attention to creditors' problems, and second, to examine today's prac-
tice as to the use of these agreements, looking specifically at their
efficacy in the passage of real property titles, motor vehicle transfers
and stock transfers. At the outset a brief summary of the statute and
some of the cases will be made for orientation purposes.
The agreement has been judicially described as two-fold in nature,
contractual and testamentary,- as not being a will5 and as a conveyance
by the decedent to the surviving spouse.6 It is recognized as sui generis.'
The statutory' requirements for such an agreement are: (1) it must
be between husband and wife, (2) in writing, (3) concerning the whole
or any portion of community property, (4) then owned or thereafter
* Partner, Felthous & Brachtenbach, Selah, Washington. Grateful acknowledgment
is made for the assistance of Thomas B. Grahn, member, Washington Bar.
I Laws of 1879, p. 77.
2 "Nothing contained in any of the provisions of this chapter or in any law of this
state, shall prevent the husband and wife from jointly entering into any agreement
concerning the status or disposition of the whole or any portion of the community
property, then owned by them or afterwards to be acquired, to take effect upon the
death of either. But such agreement may be made at any time by the husband and
wife by the execution of an instrument in writing under their hands and seals, and to
be witnessed, acknowledged and certified in the same manner as deeds to real estate
are required to be, under the laws of the state, and the same may at any time thereafter
be altered or amended in the same manner: Provided, lwwever, That such agreement
shall not derogate from the right of creditors, nor be construed to curtail the powers
of the superior court to set aside or cancel such agreement for fraud or under some
other recognized head of equity jurisdiction, at the suit of either party."
3 Comment, 25 Wash. L. Rev. 165 (1950).
'Bartlett v. Bartlett, 183 Wash. 278, 48 P.2d 560 (1935).
5 McKnight v. McDonald, 34 Wash. 98, 74 Pac. 1060 (1904).
G it re Wittman's Estate, 58 Wn.2d 841, 365 P2d 17 (1961).
7 Reagh v. Dickey, 183 Wash. 564, 48 P.2d 941 (1935).
6 RCW 26.16.120.
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acquired, (5) under the hands and seals of the parties, (6) to be
witnessed, acknowledged and certified in the same manner as deeds.
The agreement is not revoked by the subsequent insanity of one
spouse9 nor will it be revoked by the subsequent will of one spouse.'
By the language of the statute it can be altered or amended in the same
manner as created, that is, by written agreement of both spouses.
Accordingly, both parties must be competent and both must consent
to any alteration or revocation. In the event of the incompetency of
one spouse, the agreement therefore cannot be revoked. This obviously
prevents the competent spouse from circumventing the incompetent's
guardianship estate by devising his or her share elsewhere.
While the statute refers only to altering or amending the agreement,
there should be little doubt that the court would hold that the parties
have the freedom of contract to revoke the agreement by an instrument
of the same formality as the original agreement.
It is uncertain whether subsequent acts or instruments short of
an actual instrument of revocation will serve to revoke the agreement,
even though those acts or instruments are inconsistent with the ultimate
effect of the community property agreement. In a 1961 case," sub-
sequent, inconsistent acts and acts of alleged repudiation were urged
as grounds for revocation. Primarily because these acts were unilateral
and because there was no evidence of acquiescence, nor evidence of
reliance upon the unilateral acts of repudiation, the court held that
there had been no revocation. However, the court seemed to reject
the entire principle'of subsequent repudiation, short of actual revoca-
tion by instrument, by the following language:
Even if mutual repudiation may, under certain circumstances not here
present, congtitute a rescission, we are not prepared to subject the
statutory community property agreement, which serves as a recorded
conveyance of property to the surviving spouse, to the cloud of uncer-
tainty such a rule would cast upon the record and, hence, the title to the
property.12
9 In re Brown's Estate, 29 Wn.2d 20, 185 P2d 125 (1947).
10 Ibid.
11 In re Wittman's Estate, 58 Wn2d 841, 365 P.2d 17 (1961).
121n1 re Wittman's Estate, supra n. 11 at 845, 365 P.2d at 20. Quaere whether this
rationale is valid or desirable if the community property agreement has not been
recorded, for neither the execution nor the revocation of such an agreement then
would subject the record to a "cloud of uncertainty." Under the analysis of the court,
of Mr. and Mrs. Wittman had executed a formal instrument of revocation, would the
same have had to be recorded in order to be effective and to remove the "cloud of
uncertainty?"
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PROBLEMS 03F CREDITORS
Turning to the matter of creditor's rights, we encounter a vast array
of unanswered issues and conflicting theories; we must conclude that
the statute has failed completely in this area. The statute, in naive
simplicity, states: "Provided, however, That such agreement shall not
derogate from the right of creditors .... "1 Unfortunately, the statute
does not define what rights the creditors have, nor does it provide any
procedure for the creditor to enforce those rights. Therefore, it is
necessary to draw some analogies of the rights of creditors before and
after death, apart from the statute here in question. Presumably these
must be the rights which are preserved by the statute.
Prior to the debtor-spouse's death, the problems that may arise are
traceable to the Volz v. Zang" type of agreement. That case established
that a properly drafted agreement can convert the separate property
of one of the spouses to community property of the marital community.
The rationale of the case indicates that the conversion is effective im-
mediately upon the execution of the agreement. The court said: "Here,
by the voluntary act of the parties, their separate property was con-
veyed to the community." (Emphasis added.) 5
Assuming that there is a conversion of separate property into com-
munity property, what is the effect, if any, upon the creditors of the
spouses or of the community? There is no statutory requirement that
the agreement be recorded to accomplish the fact of conversion.
Whether the court would impose such a requirement to'protect credi-
tors and innocent purchasers is not clearly predictable. Consider the
case of a prospective purchaser 6 of real estate whose title search
13 RCW 26.16.120.
14 113 Wash. 378, 194 Pac. 409 (1920).
15 Volz v. Zang, 113 Wash. 378, 382, 194 Pac. 409, 410 (1920). It should be noted
that this immediate conversion principle was not necessary to the court's decision. The
same result would have obtained had the court held the conversion to be effective only
upon the death of the spouse. This construction would have complied literally with
the statutory language ". . . to take effect upon the death of either."
16 The non-use of the words "bona fide purchaser" was intentional in view of
RCW 26.16.095 which provides that an "actual bona fide purchaser" who relies on the
record showing legal title in only one person, is protected from outside claims to the
property. The Washington court has construed "actual bona fide purchaser" as
such persons as purchase without knowledge of the existence of the marriage relation,
or who could not, with reasonable diligence, have obtained such knowledge." Dane v.
Daniel, 23 Wash. 379, 392, 63 Pac. 268, 272 (1900). This means, in turn, that one is
not entitled to the status of a bona fide purchaser if the spouses have maintained the
marital relation within this state, even though they may be living separate and apart
at the time of the transaction in question. Campbell v. Sandy, 190 Wash. 528, 69
P.2d 808 (1937) ; Dane v. Daniel, supra; Adams v. Black, 6 Wash. 528, 33 Pac. 1074
(1893). The same rule has been applied to encumbrancers as well as purchasers, and
protection is afforded only if the spouses never have maintained the marital relation-
ship in this state, or at least have not done so for a considerable period of time.
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reveals that the property, at least of record, is the separate property
of the husband. The spouses, however, have previously executed an
agreement converting all separate property into community property;
this agreement has not been recorded. Assuming there is no question of
bad faith, estoppel, ratification or acquiescence binding the wife, can
the wife attack a conveyance by the husband to the purchaser on the
basis that she did not joint in the conveyance of community realty? 7
Is the grantee a "creditor" within the meaning of the statute, and if so,
does he have a right to rely upon the record?
The agreement leads to problems for creditors other than those
concerning recordation. A separate creditor of either spouse can en-
force his claim only against the separate property of that spouse."8
If a creditor has specific priority as to an asset, such as a judgment
lien on separate real estate, the conversion from separate property to
community under a Volz v. Zang type agreement should not destroy
the lien. The creditor had this right prior to the agreement and to hold
it destroyed would be a derogation by the agreement. However, would
a judgment against one spouse separately be a lien on real estate
inherited after execution of the agreement converting separate property
then owned, or thereafter acquired, into community property? Apart
from the agreement, the lien would attach to the separate property
acquired by inheritance.' Volz v. Zang' appears to hold that the
conversion aspect of the agreement is effective immediately and auto-
matically; under this analysis the property would be community and
the separate lien would not attach. Could the creditor argue success-
fully that the realty must have been separate property for an instant2
since it went to the one spouse, and only then became community
property by the terms of the agreement?
In fact, a more basic argument is that the protection of creditors'
Magee v. Risley, 82 Wash. 178, 143 Pac. 1088 (1914) ; Daly v. Rissutto, 59 Wash. 62,
109 Pac. 276 (1910) ; Canadian & American Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Bloomer, 14
Wash. 491, 45 Pac. 34 (1896) ; Schwabacher Bros. & Co. v. VanReypen, 6 Wash. 154,
32 Pac. 1061 (1893); Nuhn v. Miller, 5 Wash. 405, 31 Pac. 1031 (1892) ; Sadler v.
Niesz, 5 Wash. 182, 31 Pac. 630, 1030 (1892).
17 RCW 26.16.040.
18 See, e.g., Achilles v. Hoopes, 40 Wn.2d 664, 245 P.2d 1005 (1952) ; Smyser v.
Smyser, 17 Wn2d 301, 135 P2d 455 (1943) ; Curtis v. Hickenbottom, 158 Wash. 198,
290 Pac. 822 (1930).
19 RCW 4.56.190.
20 113 Wash. 378, 194 Pac. 409 (1920).
21 Since the judgment lien attaches automatically, this would be sufficient. Note that
since the lien would attach in the absence of the agreement, a holding that the inherited
property is not subject to the lien would derogate from this prospective right of the
creditor. Is such a "right" within the protection afforded by the statute?
[VOL. 37
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rights refers only to the "passsage" at the time of death and has no
effect upon the conversion feature. In other words, the status agree-
ment is merely incidental to the survivorship agreement and the lan-
guage regarding creditors refers only to the "transfer" at death. It is
impossible to predict the outcome of this argument.
The agreement may work to the advantage of the creditor. Con-
sider a creditor who has a judgment against the husband individually
and against the marital community. If the spouses execute an agree-
ment converting all separate property into community, the wife's
separate realty now becomes community property. Since the judgment
lien attaches to after-acquired community real estate," the creditor
appears to have a windfall.
Rights of the creditors as to personal property of the spouses or the
community should not present these problems since the specific priority
as to any particular personal property does not arise until there is a
levy." As the specific rights of the creditor are not fixed until this levy,
a subsequent conversion-type community property agreement should
not affect these rights, and a prior agreement will have determined the
status of the property prior to the accrual of such rights.
Upon the death of a spouse the rights of the creditor will depend
upon the nature of his claim and the nature of the asset against which
he seeks to enforce that claim. If he has a specific claim against par-
ticular property, as by a lien or mortgage, enforcement, at least as to
that property, will not be hindered by the fact of death, other than by
the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations on real property
is six years from the date of death." There is no specific limitation as
to personal property, and since RCW 4.16.200"5 tolls the statute until
one year after issuance of letters to the personal representative, the
creditor should never be barred by this defense, absent administration. 6
Assuming that claimant is a general creditor, what rights are pre-
22 RCW 4.56.190.
23 RCW 6.04.100 (5).
24 RCW 11.04.270. "No real estate of a deceased person shall be liable for his debts
unless letters testamentary or of administration be granted within six years from the
date of the death of such decedent: Provided, however, That this section shall not
affect the lien of any mortgage, upon specific real property, existing and recorded as
required by law at the date of the death of such decedent."
25 ",... If a person against whom an action may be brought dies before the expir-
ation of the time limited for the commencement thereof and the cause of action sur-
vives, an action may be commenced against his representatives after the expiration of
that time and within one year after the issuing of letters testamentary or of adminis-
tration."
21 Gleason v. Hawkdns, 32 Wash. 464, 73 Pac. 533 (1903) (claim not presented until
probate commenced twenty years after the death.)
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served by the statute? What is his mode of enforcement? The statute
does not create any new rights for the creditors; it merely preserves
whatever rights the creditors may have had upon death of the debtor.
The creditor should have no fewer rights than he would have under
the various statutes of descent, which provide that the property passes
to the heirs subject to debts 7
Enforcement of the claim by an action directly against the heir (the
surviving spouse under the agreement) has been recognized. 8 However,
the probate code 9 specifically grants to one or more of the principal
creditors the right to be appointed administrator if the decedent was
intestate or if the named executor refuses to act (which would neces-
sarily be the case if no probate were commenced). Does this provide
the creditor an exclusive method of enforcement so that the surviving
spouse could defend successfully a direct action on the basis that the
creditor must pursue his statutory right to be administrator? On the
other hand, if the creditor applies for appointment, can the surviving
spouse successfully defend on the theory that there is nothing subject to
the jurisdiction of the probate court since all property passes via the
agreement?
If the surviving spouse has conveyed the property to a bona fide
purchaser before the creditor attempts realization against that property,
how should the creditor proceed? In analogous situations (absent com-
munity property agreement complexities), the numerical majority of
the cases in other jurisdictions holds the property to be free of the
creditor's claim, but imposes liability upon the heir. 0 There is limited
27 RCW 11.04.020: "When any person shall die seized of any lands, tenements or
hereditaments, or any right thereto,... as his separate estate, not having devised the
same, they shall descend subject to the debts.. . ." RCW 11.04.030 (2) : "The personal
estate remaining after such allowance, shall be applied to the payment of the debts
of the deceased, . . ." RCW 11.04.050: "Upon the death of either husband or wife,
one-half of the community property shall go to the survivor, subject to the community
debts, and the other half shall be subject to testamentary disposition of the deceased
husband or wife, subject also to the community debts. In case no testamentary disposi-
tion shall have been made by the deceased husband or wife of his or her half of the
community property, [it descends to certain heirs] . . . subject to the community
debts. . . ." RCW 11.04.250: "When a person dies seized of lands, tenements or
hereditaments, or any right thereto.., his title shall vest immediately in his heirs or
devisees, subject to his debts .... "
28 "The general rule under statute is that an heir or distributee is liable for the
debts of his ancestor to the extent of, and with respect to, property of his ancestor
descended or distributed to him, where creditors are not barred by failure duly to
present their claims in administration proceedings or by lapse of time." 16 Am. Jur.
Descent and Distribution § 118 (1938). Also see 16 Am. Jur. Descent and Distribution
§§ 129-134 (1938).
20 RCW 11.28.120 (4); RCW 11.28.010.
30 See cases collected in Annot., Liability for debts of decedent's estate of propcrty




authority that imposes continued liability against the property, even
in the hands of a bona fide purchaser.3 ' There is no Washington case
directly in point.
Needless to say, the foregoing illustrates that the statute provides
something less than a satisfactory method of dealing with creditors'
rights.
EFFECT OF AGREEMENT ON WILLS
The legal interrelation of wills and community property agreements
is perplexing and without answer in the main. Assuming that a com-
munity property agreement is first executed, followed by the inconsist-
ent will of one spouse, it is established that the will does not revoke
the agreement.' Execution of the agreement, followed by inconsistent
wills of both spouses, such wills not having been executed in reliance
upon the inconsistent will of the other spouse, apparently does not
revoke the agreement." The Mittman Estate case3 seems to say that
no subsequent act amounting to repudiation will act as a revocation.
This lends certainty to the rule, but more often than not may well
thwart the intention of the parties.
In some counties it is common practice to execute community prop-
erty agreements and mutual wills simultaneously without recording the
agreement prior to death. The theory is that if use of the agreement,
after death of a spouse, will not be desirable for any reason, the will
can be probated and the agreement ignored. Certainly this practice
raises some problems. The agreement is effective immediately upon
death so that title passes to the survivor at that instant. If all assets
come within the ambit of the agreement, there is in fact no property
subject to administration. While it can be argued that the surviving
spouse has a right to waive the benefit of the agreement and can elect
to probate, there is an element of doubt if a full disclosure is made to
the probate court. If the agreement is used, and the will ignored, there
is a possible violation of the statute requiring presentation of a will
within a specified time after death. 5
31 Thomas v. Williams, 80 Kan. 632, 103 Pac. 772 (1909) ; Wyman v. Brigden, 4
Mass. 150 (1808) ; Flood v. Strong, 108 AMich. 561, 66 N.W. 473 (1896).
= "In re Brown's Estate, 29 Wn.2d 20, 185 P.2d 125 (1947).
3 In re Wittman's Estate, 58 Wn2d 841, 365 P.2d 17 (1961).
.4 58 Wn.2d 841, 365 P.2d 17 (1961).
35 RCW 11.20.010. "Any person having the custody or control of any will shall,
within thirty days after he shall have received knowledge of the death of the testator
or testatrix, deliver said will to the superior court having jurisdiction, or to the person
named in the will as executor or executrix; and any executor or executrix having in
19621
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FEDERAL AND STATE TAx AsPECTS
Tax ramifications probably are ignored more often than considered.
Use of the agreement may save probate costs, but can add a substantial
income tax burden in a particular case. Since title to the property
passes immediately upon death to the surviving spouse, all income from
the property is reportable by the surviving spouse. This destroys
possible use of the estate as a separate tax paying entity which would
be available if an estate existed.3"
Relative to state death taxes, RCW 83.24 specifically authorizes
the determination of inheritance tax without probate. The amount of
the tax, however, is not the same, for the Inheritance Tax Division of
the Washington State Tax Commission takes the position 3T that no
deduction can be allowed for debts of the decendent since there is no
court or executor qualified to allow them as required by statute.- As
a matter of policy, a reasonable allowance can be made for funeral
expenses, expenses of last illness and legal expenses in connection with
tax clearance. 9 While the statute has been amended"0 since it was
his custody or control any will shall within forty days after he received knowledge of
the death of the testator or testatrix either present the same for probate to the court
having jurisdiction, or present the same to such court with his written refusal to
serve as such executor or executrix; any person who shall wilfully violate any of the
provisions of this section with intent to injure or defraud any person shall be deemed
guilty of a gross misdemeanor, and any person who shall without reasonable excuse
violate any of the provisions of this section shall be liable to any person interested in
the will for damages caused by such neglect." Quaere whether the non-delivery of the
will can be excused by an argument that since the agreement takes precedence, the
will is of no effect. Should the custodian rely on this argument without satisfying
himself as to the validity of the agreement?
36 IxT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 641.
37 In the pamphlet published by the State Tax Commission (undated) entitled,
Guide to Inheritance Tax Reporting, p. 27, the following appears: "There is no pro-
vision in the "no-probate"' procedure for allowance of decedent's debts as deductions.
However, as a matter of Tax Commission policy, a reasonable allowance can be made
for funeral expenses, expenses of last illness, and legal expenses in connection with the
tax clearance." On the back of the official "no-probate" return form it is stated that
"Deductions may be requested for reasonable funeral expenses, expenses of last illness
unpaid at date of death, attorneys' fees incident to the tax clearance, real estate taxes
due and payable at the date of death, mortgages and liens. No deduction will be
allowed for debts of the decedent, since there is no court or executor qualified to allow
them as required by RCW 83.04.013."
38 RCW 83.04.013. "All debts owing by the decedent at the time of his death, the
local and state taxes due from the estate prior to his death, and a reasonable sum for
funeral expenses, monument or crypt, court costs, including cost of appraisement made
for the purpose of assessing the inheritance tax, the fees of executors, administrators
or trustees, reasonable attorney's fees, and family allowance not to exceed one thousand
dollars, and no other sum, shall be allowable as deductions from the gross value of
the entire property, but said debts shall not be deducted unless the same are allowed or
established within the time provided by law."
39 See supra, note 38.
40 The statute was amended to its present form by Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, c. 292 §
3, and now provides as follows: "All debts owing by the decedent at the time of his
death, the local and state taxes due from the estate prior to his death, and a reasonable
[VOL. 37
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construed in In re Lambrecht's Estate,41 the part of the statute which
provides ".... but said debts shall not be deducted unless the same are
allowed or established within the time provided by law" might be held
to allow a deduction despite the position taken by the Inheritance Tax
Division. By a judgment against the surviving spouse, based upon
community liability, it could be held that the debt had been "estab-
lished" within the time allowed by law.
If the estate may be taxable, the Tax Commission may have one of
its appraisers fix the values. 2 Contrast this situation to the usual estate
appraisal where the estate nominates two appraisers and the Tax Com-
mission only one. 3 In many cases the practical effort of the opinion
of two appraisers, particularly if they are qualified, will outweigh the
higher valuation of the Tax Commission nominee. This potential ad-
vantage is lost under the no-probate determination with the single ap-
praiser chosen by the Commission. Under the statute, however, the
surviving spouse can have a judicial review of the Commission's
determination. 4
PRACTICAL USE OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY AGREEMENT
We now turn to the matter of the efficacy of the agreement as to
specific types of assets.
Motor veckicles. Regarding the transfer of title to motor vehicles,
the Department of Licenses has a section in its manuaP outlining
sum for funeral expenses, monument or crypt, court costs, including cost of appraise-
ment made for the purpose of assessing the inheritance tax, the fees of executors, ad-
ministrators or trustees, reasonable attorney's fees, and family allowance not to exceed
one thousand dollars, and no other sum, shall be allowable as deductions from the
gross value of the entire property, but said debts shall not be deducted unless the
same are allowed or established within the time provided by law." The prior statute
contained the following language immediately after the last sentence quoted above:
"... unless otherwise ordered by the judge or court of the proper county ... " It
was this language that was deleted by the 1961 amendment.
41112 Wash. 645, 192 Pac. 1018 (1920). This case held that under the prior statute
the deduction for debts was allowed notwithstanding that there had been no probate.
The rationale was that the prior language, ". . . unless otherwise ordered by the
judge or court of the proper county, . . ." showed ". . . that a formal administration
of a decedent's estate by probate proceedings in the superior court and the establish-
ment of claims through such proceedings is not necessary to the settlement of the
inheritance tax which may be due from such estate." In re Lambrecht's Estate, 112
Wash. 645, 649, 192 Pac. 1018, 1020 (1920).
42 RCW 83.24.010. ... ..after such investigation as is necessary to determine the
fair market value of all of the property becoming subject to the inheritance tax laws,
the tax commission through its inheritance tax division shall determine the amount of
inheritance tax due, if any." Also see the State Tax Commission pamphlet, op. cit.
supra note 38, at 27.
43 RCW 83.16.040; RCW 11.44.010.
44 RCW 83.24.020.
45This pamphlet is entitled: Proceedings Necessary to Transfer Title from De-
ceased Person, Divorce & Desertion. It is available upon request.
19621
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
procedures to be followed to transfer title from a decedent. A copy
of the agreement is to be attached to the certificate of title, together with
a copy of the death certificate. With these documents the Department
will transfer title to the surviving spouse, or to a third person if the
survivor is selling the vehicle.
In many instances, the agreement will serve as a relatively inex-
pensive and fast method of vesting title to real property in the
surviving spouse.
Real property. In many instances, the agreement will serve as a
relatively inexpensive and fast method of vesting title to real property
in the surviving spouse.
Formerly the title insurance companies charged an added premium
to insure title within six years of death. 6 Under the rate schedule in
effect since September 1, 1958, such additional charge is not made.
This eliminated one of the major arguments against use of the agree-
ment to transfer title to real property without probate cost. However,
title companies have laid down certain requirements which appear
fairly standard among the several companies. It will be necessary to
prove to the satisfaction of the title company, usually by affidavit, that
there are no unpaid creditor's claims against the decedent's estate. If
a "no-probate" inheritance tax determination has not been made,
proof of the value of the estate will have to be made to show a value
well within the exemptions. If there is any question of value, a no-
probate return should be submitted to the Inheritance Tax Division.
Usually clearance of title to real property will involve these steps:
(1) record the agreement, if not already done; (2) make proof of
death, either directly to the company or by recording the death certifi-
cate; (3) obtain a no-probate inheritance tax determination or prove
that value is well within the exemptions; (4) submit proof, usually the
survivor's affidavit, and sometimes receipts, of payment of debts, par-
ticularly funeral and last illness.
Proof of the community status of the real property will be necessary
because the agreement is limited in its operation to community prop-
erty47 and therefore will not affect the title to separate property. Of
course, it is possible for the agreement to convert separate property
46 The premium was an additional 100% to insure title within two years of the
death and an additional 50% if insurance was sought between two and six years after
the death.
47 RCW 26.16.120. "... concerning the status or disposition of the whole or any
portion of the community property.. ."
(VOL. 37
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into community property, as discussed above, 8 and thus subject the
former separate property to the statutory agreement. The conversion
feature could be drafted so as to convert only specific separate property
or it could be an omnibus conversion of all property then owned or
thereafter acquired. Apparently, a mere declaration that all property,
whether separate or not, now owned or hereafter acquired, shall be
community property will be sufficient, even though words of conveyance
are not present. In the Volz case,4" operative words of conveyance were
not present, but the agreement declared that it should operate as a
"voluntary conveyance." Obviously, the parties should agree to such
a conversion only with full realization that future acquisitions by gift
or inheritance otherwise would be separate property of the receiving
spouse with control thereover. If a substantial gift or inheritance were
received by a spouse at a time of serious domestic difficulties, that
spouse might well rue the agreement giving the now dissenting spouse
rights in what would otherwise be separate property.
As discussed above, creditors of the decedent appear to have six
years from the date of death to pursue the real property as a source of
satisfaction of their claim.
If the creditor can pursue the property in the hands of a purchaser,"0
the title company has a potential liability to that purchaser and reliance
upon the self-serving affidavit of the surviving spouse is hardly a satis-
factory method of proving that such exposure does not exist. Apart
from the final legal adjudication that might be made, a creditor could
sue the purchaser, alleging his claim as a prior right to the property.
Presumably the purchaser would tender the defense to the title com-
pany. Faced with the costs of defense in an area of legal uncertainty
and problems of public relations, the title company may find settlement
quite attractive regardless of the merits of the action.
Consider also the problems of the title company which accepts an
affidavit that all community obligations and debts have been paid.
Under the decision of In re McHugh's Estate,5 the decedent's portion
of the community property becomes liable for his or her separate debts,
and the title company might learn too late that the affidavit was in fact
not true or at least misleading, and that the property was burdened with
separate debt claims.52
4 8 Supra, notes 15 and 16, and accompanying text.
49 Volz v. Zang, 113 Wash. 378, 194 Pac. 409 (1920).50 Su ra, note 32, and accompanying text.
51 165 Wash. 123, 4 P2d 834 (1931).
52 This is, of course, based on the implicit assumption that this rule will apply in-
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Apart from the questions arising from separate property, the un-
answered doubts about creditors' rights and possible increased tax
burdens in some instances, it must be concluded that the agreement
does offer a means of vesting title to real property in the surviving
spouse with a minimum of delay and expense. Of course, the statistics
indicating that creditors' problems seem to arise infrequently will be
of little comfort to the victim of such creditors' claims.
Corporate Stock Transfers. Use of the agreement to transfer corpo-
rate stock will meet varying degrees of frustration. Transfer of stock in
a Washington corporation, where there may be some familiarity with
the community property agreement, is often relatively simple. For
example, such a transfer has been accomplished by furnishing a certi-
fied copy of the death certificate, a photostat of the agreement and the
usual indemnity agreement. 3
As would be expected, more difficulty will be encountered with the
transfer agent in another state who probably never before heard of
such an agreement. The following requirements in such cases are not
unusual: (1) copy of the agreement certified by the county auditor;
(2) certified copy of death certificate; (3) proof of marital status at
time of execution and until time of death; (4) proof of residence of
spouses in Washington at time of execution; (5) proof of community
character of stock; (6) proof of continued existence of agreement;
(7) absence of fraud or other ground as basis for setting aside; (8) legal
age and mental competency of spouses at time of execution; (9) absence
of unpaid obligations of decedent or community; (10) no-probate
proceedings pending; (11) adequate and satisfactory indemnity fur-
nished by survivor, consisting of an indemnity agreement and a surety
bond."'
Uninformed Use of the Agreements. It is the uninformed use of the
agreement which causes greatest concern. Forms are obtained easily
the non-probate situation. There is no direct authority, but the rationale of the court,
being based on the fact that death dissolves the community, in the opinion of the
author, should be applicable generally.
53 The author recently effected a transfer in this manner. The corporation did not
request an indemnity bond, but did take an indemnity agreement from the surviving
spouse. The procedure will vary with different corporations. The author is aware of
a case wherein the King County Superior Court held that the widow could not force
the particular corporation concerned to transfer to her shares of the corporation
stock formerly held in the name of her deceased husband, since there was no method
short of probate that would relieve the corporation of its concern relative to claims of
creditors. Unfortunately, perhaps, the case was not appealed. McDowell v. Seattle 1st
Nat'l Bank, No. 579503 (Sup. Ct., King Co., Wash., July 17, 1962).




from various sources. It is suspected that they are filled in by laymen
who possess varying degrees of knowledge. Motivated by the belief
that these agreements will save "all those probate costs," many persons
execute the agreement with the help of laymen, but completely without
regard to their particular assets and often in contradiction to their
intended disposition of their estate. For example, the author is aware
of a husband and wife, without children, executing such an agreement
with the aid of a layman, but without the advice of counsel. After the
husband's death, the title company would not insure title to certain real
property since it appeared of record that it was the husband's separate
property and the agreement used was not sufficient to convert it into
community property. Under the statute, 5 one half of the property went
to the husband's brothers and sisters and his nieces and nephews by
right of representation. Another actual case involved a husband and
wife who had executed carefully drawn wills. The dispositive plan of
each will recognized and provided for the family of each spouse by an
earlier marriage. Some years later, having been urged to sign a com-
munity property agreement to avoid probate costs, these same spouses
executed such an agreement. Fortunately, despite the admonition of
the layman-draftsman never to show the agreement to a lawyer, the
parties subsequently did seek advice of counsel. When advised of the
ultimate result of the community property agreement, they promptly
revoked the agreement.
Such illustrations point up the danger of uninformed use of the
agreements, but the very simplicity and informality with which the
form agreement can be executed leads to the conclusion that there will
be continued uninformed use.
CONCLUSION
In some areas at least, there has been a substantial increase in use
of the community property agreement. For example, in Yakima County
the number of recordings of these agreements soared from 35 in a six
month period in 1951 to 240 in a six month period in 1962." The vast
majority of these agreements are recorded by the parties prior to the
death of either spouse. During this same period the number of deaths
in the county and the number of probates increased almost exactly in
5r RCW 11.04.020 (2).




direct proportion to the population increase.57 Since many of these
agreements are recorded at the time of execution and prior to death,
it is predicted that the number of probates will decline substantially in
later years as deaths occur among those now executing agreements.
This increased use can be attributed to several causes. First, some
labor unions have publicized to their members the supposed advantages
of the agreement. Second, some lawyers found considerably more
enthusiasm for the agreement when faced with joint tenancy under
Initiative 208,58 presumably on the theory that the agreement was the
lesser of the two evils.
The foregoing indicates that there is widespread use of the agree-
ment, despite the many unsolved problems. It is urged that the State
Bar Association accept the responsibility of drafting and sponsoring
legislation to cure the defects inherent in the statute, particularly in
relation to creditors' rights.
57 In 1951, 476 probates were filed with the Yakima County Superior Court Clerk
and in 1961, 517 were filed, according to information furnished by that Clerk. Deaths
numbered 1199 in 1951 and 1256 in 1961 according to statistics provided by the Yakima
County Health Department. The population increase in the county from 1950 to 1960
was 6.9% according to the Research Council's Handbook, State and Local Government
in Washington (1st Ed., 1961-1962).
58 Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch2; RCW 64.28.
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